Friday, June 26, 2015
My latest paper (with my views about truth)
It is titled “Naturalism, Realism and Normativity” and it has just appeared in the new Journal of the American Philosophical Association/Volume 1/Issue 02/June 2015/pp. 312-328.
It argues, inter alia, that Tarski’s results do not support deflationism about truth, contrary to what is often assumed. I write there,
“Tarski’s formal methods intuitively draw on and presuppose not just one property of truth, the T-Schema, or Disquotation, but on that property AND the further property that the extension of “true” depends on the extension of “refers”. The concepts of truth and of reference are intimately related, and his entire procedure exploits the relation.”
I also briefly describe and endorse Tyler Burge’s claim that reference is psychologically more primitive and more ubiquitous than language use.
If you are a member of the APA you will receive the journal automatically (it is free to members this first year of publication). If you aren’t, please get your library to subscribe, or at least to get online access!
This paper is directly relevant to my current posts on Davidson and on truth-evaluable content.