In the August 30 post I attributed to Noam Chomsky views he disavowed in an e-mail to me (the text of the message is my September 9 post). What follows is
HOW THE AUGUST 30 POST SHOULD HAVE READ:
In my next post I will say how the mistake came about, and why some of Chomsky's formulations did strike me as suggesting that he believes the "language organ" that he posits has to contain representations of all learnable meanings (which is the feature of Fodor's original "mentalese" hypothesis that I find unsupportable).
I do not believe in “innate language”, (e.g., Fodor’s “mentalese”, which, when he wrote The Language of Thought, was supposed to have a built-in truth-conditional semantics, that is a semantics which fixes the meanings of all the sentences a human is capable is thinking (later Fodor moved to the position that “mentalese” has only a built-in syntax, and developed a causal theory of reference to account for content). Here are my reasons for this rejection.